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Abstract
We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory using the
prisoner’s dilemma as metaphor of the problem. Considering the growing process of the system
and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions that allow to form highly cooperative
networks of any size and topology. Introducing general considerations of real systems, we reduce the
required conditions for cooperation to evolve approaching the benefit-cost ratio r to the theoretical
minimum r = 1, when the mean connectivity of the individuals is increased. Through the paper,
we distinguish different mechanisms that allow the system to maintain high levels of cooperation
when the system grows by incorporation of defectors. These mechanisms require heterogeneity
among individuals for cooperation to evolve. However, the required conditions and heterogeneities
are drastically reduced as compared to those required for static networks.
Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary Game Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Networks; Growing
Systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation [1–4] is present in every form of life, some examples are the cells working
together in order to form multicellular organisms and these working together to form societies
such as anthills and the human society. It is noteworthy that cooperating biological systems
make up new organisms that in turn can cooperate to form a new one with higher complexity.
This shows that cooperation is a mechanism through which nature increases complexity of
life. In this way, if there are organisms made up by other cooperative organisms, what
would happen when for some reason these stop cooperating? What would happen to us if
our cells stop cooperating? We easily note that the lack of cooperation means the death
of the most complex organism. Therefore, the emergence of cooperation produces a new
biological organism that dies when cooperation disappears.
Understanding how cooperation emerges and persist in the framework of Darwinian The-
ory is a big challenge that has received attention for decades [5–14] but still has problems
to be solved. Evolutionary game theory [15, 16] has proved to be an appropriate theoretical
framework to formally represent the problem. In this theory, the interactions between two
individuals are represented by a game in which each player adopts a strategy. The system
evolves replicating more often the strategies of successful individuals in the game. In par-
ticular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been the most widely studied game as metaphor of the
cooperation problem. In this game, each player adopts one of the two possible strategies,
cooperation (C) or defection (D). When in an interaction both individuals cooperate each
receive a Payoff R and other one P under mutual defection. If one cooperates and the other
defects, the former receives S and the second T . The game is completely defined when
T > R > P > S. Under these conditions and in a one-shot game, it is better to defect no
matter the strategy adopted by the opponents. Thus, in fully connected systems defection
always has the highest reproduction rate. Therefore, the system evolves decreasing the frac-
tion of cooperators to extinction. This highlights the difficulty of the cooperation problem
when it is framed within the Darwinian Theory.
Until the early nineties the problem was only considered in fully connected systems. So,
to overcome the problem it is necessary to introduce features to individuals that increase
the strategic complexity of the game. In 1981, Axelrod and Hamilton [6] showed that coop-
2
eration based on reciprocity evolves when interacting individuals know that the probability
of new encounters is high enough. In addition, other possibilities have been considered, as
individuals with reputation [10] and punishment for defectors [14]. In a pioneering work
[17], Nowak and May studied the problem over regular lattices, where all individuals have
an equal number of neighbors k < N − 1, with N the size of the system. In this case,
each individual is limited to interact only with its neighbors rather than with the whole
system. In this way and without increasing the strategic complexity, they showed that there
are conditions under which cooperation is not extinguished. This shows us that locality of
individuals is fundamental to the evolution of cooperation as well as the need to introduce
new topological features of real systems. However, the lack of knowledge of these structures
delayed until the beginning of the third millennium the publication of new works following
this way [18–32]. In 2005, Santos et. al. [19, 20] showed the importance that the degree
heterogeneity may have [29–31] for cooperation. In particular, the scale-free degree dis-
tributions are those that most favor cooperation in static systems and when the effective
Payoff of individuals is the accumulated one from interaction with their neighbors. These
systems are characterized by a distribution of the number of links k, governed by a power
law P (k) ∼ k−γ, with 2 < γ < 3. This is an outstanding result because scale-free behavior
is common in biological and technological systems [33]. Also other typical structures of real
systems such as high clustering coefficient [21, 22] and degree-degree correlations [26] have
been considered.
These works [17–31] assume static networks large enough to ensure that the topological
features under study are well developed. Initially each individual adopts cooperation o de-
fection with equal probability, in order to not favor any strategy. Then the system evolves
following an evolutionary game until it reaches the steady state, characterized by a stable
fraction of cooperators. Although this form of modeling the cooperation problem introduces
significant features of real systems it has some limitations. In particular, cooperative biolog-
ical systems do not emerge spontaneously fully developed but they are formed by a growing
process from one or few individuals. Furthermore, it is remarkable that in all stages the
system has levels of cooperation higher than half of the population. These features have
important consequences for the conditions required for cooperation to evolve when individ-
ual have imitation capacity [34]. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out extensive studies
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considering the growing process as an essential ingredient for cooperation. Furthermore,
another feature of any biological systems is the possibility of mutation, which in the context
of cooperation means a spontaneous change of strategy. Therefore, taking into account the
growing process and the possibility of mutations, we formulated the cooperation problem as
follows:
- What conditions should the system have to grow as a highly cooperative system?
- What are the system properties that allow to overcome the emergence of mutant defec-
tors in a cooperative system?
In this paper we explore the cooperation problem considering the growing process of the
system. It is noteworthy that this process has also been considered [35, 36] as a mechanism
to introduce co-evolutionary dynamics [35–40], where the strategies of individuals and topo-
logical features are correlated. We consider the topological structure and the evolution of
strategies decoupled. We focus our attention in the first question assuming that the probabil-
ity of mutation is low enough to be neglected, this is a routinely simplification in literature
[17–32, 34]. As it was previously mentioned, the result of interactions of each individual
defines its Payoff which increments its fitness. Therefore, natural selection is introduced
through payoff since individuals with a higher one reproduce more. The reproduction can
be either genetic or cultural. When it is genetic, the most successful individuals have the
most offspring. When reproduction is cultural the strategies of successful individuals are
more likely to be imitated by their neighbours. In this work, unless otherwise indicated,
we implement the evolutionary game theory for cultural reproduction. Therefore, we are
considering that individuals have imitation capacity.
II. THE MODEL
The system is represented by a network of interconnected nodes. Each node is an in-
dividual who interacts with those who are connected with it. Unless otherwise stated, we
considered all nodes equal and all connections undirected and with equal weight. Each in-
teraction is modeled by a round of the prisoner’s dilemma game. We choose T = b, R = 1,
P = 0 and S = −c to reduce the analysis to a single parameter defined by the benefit-
cost ratio r = b/c. Strategies evolve by the finite population analog of replicator dynamics
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[19, 20] for the prisoner’s dilemma. To compute the Payoff Pi of individual i we perform
the following. If i is a cooperator, after interacting with their neighbors it obtains a Payoff
Pi = k
c
i b − kic, where ki is the degree of i and kci the number of cooperative neighbors.
When i is a defector linked to kci cooperators it gets a Payoff Pi = k
c
i b. After an interaction
for each connection of the system, all strategies are updated simultaneously (synchronous
update) as follows: Each individual i randomly chooses a neighbor j and compares Pi with
Pj. If Pi ≥ Pj the player i keeps its strategy. On the other hand, if Pi < Pj the player i
adopts the strategy of its neighbor j with probability Pj→i = (Pj − Pi)/km(b + c), where
km = max{ki; kj}. The denominator ensures a proper normalization of the transition prob-
ability. A complete update of the system is called a generation. Furthermore, the results
reported throughout the paper are qualitatively equivalent when strategies are updated in an
asynchronous way or when [34] the update rule is replaced by the Fermi rule [34–36] for all
non-zero natural selection intensity. The latter is important because shows that conclusions
are robust to error desicions of the individuals since the Fermi rule allows that individual i
takes strategy of j even when Pi ≥ Pj.
To take into account the growing process and the strategies update simultaneously it
is necessary to define a temporal scale. We accomplished this through the system size
assuming that dN(t)
dt
= aN(t), where a is the growth rate. When the elimination of nodes
is not considered, the growth rate is equal to the frequency with which individuals are
incorporated to the system, this is considered constant over time. Therefore, the population
grows exponentially as N(t) = N(t0)e
a(t−t0). Between two generations the system grows a
time ∆t. So if a strategy update is performed when the system has a population N(t0), then
the next one is performed when the system has a population N(t0 + ∆t) = N(t0)e
a∆t =
N(t0)(1+n). Consequently, the strategies are updated each time the system grows a fraction
n, it is important to note that a∆t ' n when a∆t << 1. Unless indicated otherwise, results
are obtained for n = 0, 001. It has been checked that the results do not change significantly
for n ∈ [0, 01; 0]. In particular, as it has been shown in [34], there is an enhancement of
the cooperation level into the system when n decrease. At some nc > 0, 01 the number of
defectors who join the system before the next generation increase the required conditions
for cooperation to prevail. Moreover, from some n the number of defectors that become
cooperators in a generation is less than the number of defectors introduced to the system
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in the same time. Therefore, the system is not able to sustain cooperation under any set of
conditions. Finally, the model can be extended to considered other kinds of growth as for
instance the logistic one, where the system initially grows exponentially in time but then it
slows down until the system acquires a maximum size called carrying capacity of the system.
Under this kind of behavior, it is expected that the frequency with which new individuals are
incorporated to the system decreses in time and, therefore, the growing proportion n before
a strategy update also decrease. Therefore, the qualitative conclusions reached through the
paper do not change when it is performed this kind of considation.
Actual cooperative systems grow from one or a few individuals by incorporating new
ones through two different mechanisms. On one hand, the new individuals may come from
the reproduction of individuals of the system and, therefore, related genetically. On the
other hand, the system grows by the incorporation of independent individuals who could
not be related genetically to existing individuals. However, unless otherwise specified, the
proportion of new individuals coming from each of the two sources does not change the
results. Throughout the paper we use different models for the growth of the network; they
are justified and detailed when necessary. Finally, we must specify how individuals adopt
the strategy in the first interaction with its neighbors. The Darwinian Theory restricts how
strategies evolve but gives complete freedom in the initial strategy of each individual. We
define Pc as the probability that an individual is initially cooperator. In the literature [17–
31], it is often taken Pc = 1/2 in order to not favor any strategy. For our purposes we can
relax the condition to just Pc 6= 0 in order to introduce cooperation into the system.
Throughout the paper we compare the results for the growing systems with those found
in static systems [19–21]. This allow us to show the importance of the growing process of
the system for cooperation. The results for static systems were obtained by considering a
population N = 104. Initially we randomly distributed cooperators and defectors. Then the
system evolves following the evolutionary dynamics specified in the first paragraph of this
section. The reported results have been obtained when the evolutionary dynamic acquires a
stable state. This has been defined as follows when the system is static and when it grows:
Static systems: The stationary regime is characterized by the average fraction of cooper-
ators c¯ the system. The value of c¯ is computed as follows. The system evolves a transient
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of ∆g = 104 generations. Then we study the evolution of the number of cooperators c(g) of
each generation g during time windows of ∆g = 103 generations by computing the average
value and fluctuations of c(g). When the fluctuations are less than or equal to 1/
√
N we
stop the simulation and calculate c¯ of the realization as c¯ = Σgc(g)/(∆gN). The reported
values have been obtained by averaging 100 realizations corresponding to 10 different initial
conditions of the strategies for 10 different networks.
Growing systems: The system evolves following the model up to N = 104. Then, we stop
the growth and calculate c¯ using the same stability criterion used for static systems. We
adopt this procedure for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows us to make a correct com-
parison of results with those obtained in static systems because both values are obtained by
the same procedure. On the other hand, growing systems have a phase transition from non-
cooperative to cooperative behaviors for a r critical rc. As r → rc the levels of cooperation
within the system are modified each time more slowly as the system grows. Therefore, to
properly characterize the transition as the system grows, it is necessary to reach increasingly
larger systems making the task difficult. It has been checked that the conclusions reached
are not altered if c¯ is calculated by applying a criterion of stability as the system grows. The
results reported are obtained by averaging over 40 realizations.
III. RESULTS
A. Model analysis
To perform a clear analysis from the literature [17–32] we study the model as follows. We
assume that there are conditions under which the system reaches a state of Ni cooperators.
We take Ni large enough to ensure that the macroscopic topological structures under study,
such as the degree distribution, are well developed. From this structure, we seek the con-
ditions required to maintain a stable and high level of cooperation when the system grows
by the incorporation of defectors. This simulates the worst condition that the cooperative
system must resist. Using the conditions found we look for the minimum Ni = Nc of coop-
erators that ensure the stability of the cooperation level within the system. We carry out
this analysis for two different growth mechanisms yielding realism to the network generation
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model. This procedure reduces the minimal conditions to keep cooperation stable. Then,
we study the model when the cost to maintain a link is considered. For this purpose we
make changes to the way individuals accumulate Payoffs. Finally, we focus our attention on
the first individuals of the system showing conditions that allow us to form a cooperative
structure of Nc cooperators as well as to form cooperative systems of any size and topology.
B. The model in Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks
As we previously mentioned in the introduction, the degree heterogeneity plays a key
role for cooperation when the problem is modeled by the evolutionary dynamic discussed in
Section II, but applied in static networks. In this case, the scale-free degree distributions,
very abundant in nature, are the most suitable ones for cooperation to evolve. Taking this as
motivation and to make an appropiate comparison of results with those obtained in previous
works [19–21], we began studying the model considering a growing process of the system
given by the Baraba´si-Albert Model (BAM) [41]. In this model, the system grows from N0
fully connected individuals through the incorporation of new individuals with L ≥ No new
links, we consider L = N0. Each new connection is performed by preferential attachment
[41] with nodes of the system. These incorporate a new connection with a probability
proportional to its degree and avoiding double connections with the new individual. This
procedure produces scale-free networks with exponent γ ' 2, 9 in the thermodynamic limit
N →∞.
In Figure 1a we show the fraction of cooperators as a function of the benefit-cost ratio
r for different values of L. As it shows, the system exhibits a phase transition from a non-
cooperative to a cooperative state when r exceeds the critical threshold rc ' 2, 9. We note
a slight decrease of rc when L increases. Nonetheless, this behavior becomes less apparent
when L increases. We have verified this behavior to L = 32. Therefore, considering that the
mean degree k¯ ' 2L when N >> L, we may consider rc independent of k¯ when the system
grows by BAM. This can be understood by approaching c¯ by 1 when r > rc. Under this
condition the new defectors receive a Payoff proportional to L given that all its neighbors
are cooperators. Furthermore, we can assume that the new defector exploits cooperators
with an average Payoff proportional to k¯. Therefore, given that the relation k¯/L ' 2 is
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Figure 1: The model in Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks. Fraction of cooperators c¯ as a function
of the benefit-cost ratio r for differents values of L. a) Growing systems. b) Static systems.
independent of L, it is expected rc to be independent of k¯. Moreover, the striking similarity
between the exponent of the degree distribution and rc motivates analytical studies in order
to explore a possible relationship. Finally, for r > rc there is an increment of the fraction of
cooperators when L increases, causing a slight increase in rc for small L.
In Figure 1b we show analogous results obtained over static networks. Comparing these
with those shown in Figure 1a we note a significant decrease of rc when it is considered the
growing process of the system. The origin of this difference is determined by two fundamental
characteristics caused by the growing process. On the one hand, the system always has high
levels of cooperation instead of initially half of the population considered in static systems.
On the other hand, cooperators inhabit the most connected parts of the system rather than
being initially randomly distributed. This reduces the exploitation capacity of defectors
to a minimum because it is proportional to its degree k. Also, when we considered static
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systems, there is an increase of rc to growing L. We have corroborated this behavior for
values of L higher (up to L = 32) than those shown. Thus, the benefits from the system
growth increase with k¯. Therefore, taking into account Figure 1a and 1b we shown that the
growing process is fundamental to the evolution of cooperation [34]. It is important to note
as it has been shown previously [21, 24, 32], that the conditions required for cooperation to
evolve increase with increasing k¯ in static systems. However, it is curious to note that an
opposite behavior has been reported in [19], making furhter checks necessary.
Figure 2: The model in Barabasi-Albert scale-free networks. Cooperation fixation probability as a
function of the number of initial cooperators for differents values of L. We have considered r = 3, 5
and M = 500.
In Figure 2 we show the cooperation fixation probability Pf (Ni) for different values of
L, where Pf is defined as the probability that a system of Ni cooperators continues being
cooperative when it grows by the incorporation of defectors. To obtain Pf we select a value
r > rc and we perform M simulations starting from a system of Ni cooperators. Then,
we compute the number Mc of systems that reach N = 10
4 with a fraction of cooperators
c¯ > 1/2. Finally, we compute Pf for each Ni as Mc/M . As it can be seen in all curves,
Pf grows steeply and reaches the value 1 for a size N = Nc ∼ 100. From this structure,
called Cooperative Seed (CS) [34], the cooperation is stable despite the system grows by
incorporating defectors. When the system is small, the degree distribution may not be
well developed, thus reducing the degree heterogeneity between the new individuals and the
rest of the system, necessary [34] to resist the defection invasion introduced by the new
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individuals. Therefore, the cooperation can be extinguished because of finite-size effects
when N < Nc. We have also checked that Nc decreases as r increases because less degree
heterogeneity causes an increase in rc, as shown in both growing [34] and static [19–21]
systems. One could expect that Nc → ∞ when r → rc, but it is found that the results
shown in Figure 1a do not change significantly when Ni > 200. Therefore, it is a good
approximation to assume rc 6= rc(N). In static systems the conditions for the evolution
of cooperation are valid [19] from Nc ∼ 100. This is important because it assures us to be
making a correct comparison of the results. The Cooperative Seed can be justified considering
the probability PNc = (Pc)
Nc 6= 0 to have the first Nc cooperators. However, unless Pc → 1,
the cooperative seed size leads to a very small probability PNc that makes difficult the
formation of cooperative systems. Therefore, we have to introduce new considerations to
reduce the Cooperative Seed.
C. Model A and its consequences for cooperation
In this subsection we modify the growth mechanism BAM making considerations on the
formation of links and the incorporation of individuals. For this we have the caution of not
losing the scale-free behavior introduced by BAM. In this, each new individual performs
L simultaneous connections to the system. However, in real systems the individuals do
not make several connections simultaneously. Instead, each connection is incorporated at
different times. This feature is important because it gives the possibility of strategy updates
when individuals have less than L connections and therefore reduces the exploitation capacity
of those who are defectors. We introduce this by considering the formation of new links
within the system at the same time that new individuals join it. Below we introduce the
Model A (MA) for network generation.
Just as in BAM, the system grows by incorporating new individuals from a fully connected
network of N0 individuals. In addition, each new individual incorporates to the system
L = N0 links. But instead of all new links belong to the new individual, we perform a
splitting of the L connections. On the one hand, the new individual performs its first link
(FL) with the system through preferential attachment. On the other hand, the remaining
L − 1 links (RL) are performed by choosing a random individual who makes a connection
11
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Figure 3: The model A. Accumulated degree distribution Pa(k) for L = 3 and N = 10
4. The
reported values have been obtained by averaging over 100 different networks.
to any other individual of the network chosen by preferential attachment. To see how the
splitting of the L connections affects the degree distribution P (k), we placed in Figure 3 the
accumulated degree distribution Pa(k) =
∞∫
k
P (k)dk emerged from MA for L = 3. Also, we
show the analogous result obtained by BAM. As shown in it, both models have in their tails
equivalent behavior, decaying as a power law with exponent γ = 2, 9 followed by a faster
decay after some degree k. The latter effect is caused by a finite size effect of the system.
However, in contrast to BAM, Model A allows nodes with degree k < L but preserving the
mean degree k¯ ' 2L. This generates a decrease in the number of links among individuals
with k < k¯ which is compensated by an increase in the connectivity of individuals with
degree k > k¯. This fact is reflected through the bending of the degree distribution for small
k and a shift of the scale-free behavior to the right in the degree distribution of MA. It
is noteworthy that the bending for small k is a typical feature in real systems [33] and,
therefore, through MA we have introduced greater realism the model.
The simple modification introduced through MA allows some reinterpretations in the
way that the RL are generated. In BAM, one of the ends of the RL is always connected
to the new individual. But now both link ends can be attached to any individual of the
system. This symmetry allows us interpret that the RL are performed as follows. First, we
randomly choose an individual i of the system. This performs one of the L − 1 RL with
probability ki/
∑
j kj with another randomly chosen individual of the system. We repeat the
procedure until all the L− 1 links have been made. Thus the connection instead of ending
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on a preferential way, is born preferably from well-connected individuals. This attributes to
the connections between individuals the capacity of reproduction. This is of interest because
it suggests a possible explanation for the origin of the preferential attachment required for
scale-free behavior of real systems. Also, this could be an important mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation taking into account that cooperative links are the most successful
ones and therefore with higher reproduction rate. This kind of interpretation may also be
justified from a biological point of view considering that a set of cooperating individuals form
a new individual and, therefore, with the potential to reproduce. For a complete analysis of
Model A as well as other alternatives on the same line we refer to [42].
Figure 4: The model over networks generated by MA. Fraction of cooperators c¯ as a function of
the benefit-cost ratio r for differents values of L. a) Growing systems. b) Static systems.
In Figure 4a we show the fraction of cooperators as a function of r for different values of
L when the system is generated by MA. As expected, the system shows a phase transition
from a non-cooperative to a cooperative behavior for some r critical rc1. It is remarkable
that rc1 is significantly lower than the rc obtained by BAM, showing the importance to
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the cooperation of the splitting performed to the L links. As we can observe, the value of
rc1 decreases when k¯ increases. We have checked that this behavior still makes rc1 tend to
the theoretical minimum 1 (for L = 32, rc ' 1.3). The reduction of rc1 arises because the
increase of k¯ enhances the average differences between the connectivity of new individuals
and the rest of the system. Also, surprisingly, the system exhibits a new phase transition
that slightly increases the level of cooperation with critical threshold rc2. This shows that the
system has different mechanisms to resist the invasion of defectors and which are activated at
different rc. It is important to note that rc2 matches with rc obtained when the system grows
by BAM. On the one hand, this similarity shows that rc2 is determined by the topological
features shared by BAM and MA, namely the tails of the degree distributions. On the other
hand, the topological difference between the two network models, namely the curvature of
the distribution for low degree, produces the appearance of a new mechanism for cooperation
to evolve. However, the underlying processes by which the system resists the invasion of
defectors are still unclear and of great interest. Therefore, it is necessary to perform deeper
analyses to fully understand these phenomena. It is important to note that it has been
checked that this new transition is not a consequence of the stability criterion adopted.
In Figure 4b we place c¯(r) obtained when we consider static systems generated by MA for
different values of L. Again, the system exhibits a phase transition from a non-cooperative
to a cooperative behavior for some rc. It is remarkable that the behavior of c¯ is equivalent
to that obtained from BAM. In this way, we show that the local considerations introduced
through MA do not generate a significant impact on the cooperation levels achieved in static
systems. However, comparing the results with those of figure 4a we notice huge differences in
the conditions for cooperation to evolve. In this way we categorically show the importance
of the growing process for the emergence of structured cooperative populations.
Finally, in Figure 5a we show Pf (Ni) for various L. Again we observe that Pf reaches the
value 1 when the cooperative system reaches a size N = Nc ∼ 20. Thus we show that MA
not only generates a reduction of rc but also produces a significant decrease in the CS size.
This is because there are strategy updates when individuals have less than L connections.
However, MA has some limitations in this task when the system is small. In particular, when
N ∼ N0, MA is equivalent to BAM and therefore there are not strategy updates among the
first L connections of the new individual. This makes that defectors have more exploitation
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Figure 5: The model over networks generated by MA. Cooperation fixation probability as a function
of the initial number of cooperators for different values of L. We have been considered r = 3, 5
y M = 500, we choose these values in order to perform a correct comparison with the results
showed in figure 2. a) Without strategies update between the L links introduced between two new
individuals. b) Allowing strategies update between the L links.
capacity when the strategies are updated. To overcome this drawback we not only considered
the possibility of strategy updates when the system grows in population but also when it
grows in connections. As we defined in Section II, a strategy update is performed each
time the system grows a fraction n. Therefore, when the system is large there are several
individuals and links introduced to the system before a strategy update. This makes that the
results are equivalent if the strategy updates are considered between individuals or between
connections. However, when the system is small there are several strategy updates with the
incorporation of a single individual. Therefore it becomes important to have the possibility
of updates between the L connections introduced to the system for each new individual.
In Figure 5c we show the cooperation fixation probability Pf (Ni) for different values of
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L when strategy updates between the L connections are considered. As we shown, this
produces a significant reduction of the Cooperative Seed. Now Nc ' N0 that corresponds
to the theoretical minimum that allows MA since the system grows from N0 individuals.
Therefore, we have reduced the problem of the emergence of cooperation when it is modeled
by the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma to justify the first N0 cooperators. In this way we
show the importance of the considerations made in the way in which new individuals and
links are introduced to the system.
IV. POTENTIALITY OF INDIVIDUALS
In the evolutionary dynamics employed previously we have considered that all connec-
tions have equal weight in the Payoff of individuals. Under this condition, the degree het-
erogeneities introduce heterogeneities in the Payoffs that favor the emergence of cooperation
[19–21]. However, a central criticism [29–31] of this evolutionary dynamics is that not all
connections can be considered equal. In particular, it is often argued that each connection
requires the investment of resources such as time, which are finite, and therefore the incor-
poration of new links does not always increase linearly the potentiality of each individual.
We define the potentiality pi of individual i as the maximum theoretical effective Payoff
P effi that an individual can get from its neighborhood divided by b. Thus, for the previous
results showed we have considered pi = ki assuming that each individual has limitless re-
sources that allow it to increase its potentiality without bound. At the other extreme, we
can considered that individuals use all its resources regardless of the number of connections
and therefore pi = 1 for all ki. Therefore, the maximum potentiality is independent of the
connectivity of the individual. When this situation is considered [31] disappear the benefits
for the emergence of cooperation resulting from the degree heterogeneity.
However, it is expected that increasing the connectivity of an individual will enhance its
potential in some way. In particular, we can consider the existence of a maximun potentiality
p = K determined by those finite resources necessary to interact. We introduced this
as follows. On the one hand, if ki ≤ K then pi = ki and the effective Payoff P effi of
individual i is equal to Pi. On the other hand, if ki > K we calculated the effective Payoff
as P effi = (Pi/ki)K. In Figure 6 we show the fraction of cooperators c¯ as a function of K
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Figure 6: Potentiality of individuals. Fraction of cooperators c¯ as a function of the maximum
potentiality K for some values of L. Results obtained using MA for the network generation. We
have been considered r = 2, 8 and averaged the values over 40 different realizations.
for different values of L. It is seen that the system exhibits a phase transition from a non-
cooperative to a cooperative behavior for some maximum potentiality Kc. It is remarkable
that the result is independent of the system size for all N > Nc = N0. In addition, we
observe that the result does not depend strongly on the mean degree k¯. No significant
differences have been observed to L = 32. Figure 6 shows that when the system growth is
considered, it is not necessarily a linear Payoff accumulation with k for cooperation prevails
when the system grows. This is remarkable considering the importance of the hubs for
the emergence of cooperation when static systems are considered [19–21]. Furthermore,
when b and c are determined by the total system production and considering that this
is independent of the wealth distribution, the consideration of a maximum potentiality
produces an increment in r that not just improves the conditions of individuals with k < K
but also the conditions for the whole system for cooperation prevail. However, it is still
essential that degree heterogeneities increment individual Payoffs in some way. In addition,
an important consequence of this result is that it shows the possibility of considering aging
and death of individuals without drastically modifying the conditions for cooperation to
evolve.
We can reach similar conclusions by considering the results shown in Figures 2 and 5. In
them we show that beyond some Nc the system resists the incorporation of defectors when
17
r > rc and, therefore, the system has reached the necessary heterogeneities for cooperation
to prevail. When the system continues to grow from NC , the differences between the Payoff
of the new individuals and the more connected one of the system increase. However, this
does not reduce the required conditions for cooperation to prevail because, as we showed,
rc 6= rc(N). This independence suggests the existence of the critical potentiality Kc.
V. CONSIDERATION FOR THE FIRST LINK OF INDIVIDUALS
Although with MA we have introduced greater realism, the system still lacks some topo-
logical properties of real systems, such as a high coefficient of degree, which are of great
interest. Such structures can be introduced through local considerations in the way the
RL are performed, see [32]. Besides, it is interesting to have some caution in the way that
FL are made. Both in BAM and MA, the FL are made by preferential attachment. In a
highly cooperative system, with K infinite, the success of individuals is almost proportional
to their degree k. Therefore, in systems where a greater success in the game leads to more
offspring, it is a good approximation to assume that the FL are performed by preferential
attachment when new individuals are caused by reproduction of individuals of the system.
However, in systems such as the human society a better approximation is to assume the
same reproduction rate for all individuals regardless of the success achieved in the game.
Moreover, in the case that new individuals arise from the reproduction of individuals in the
system, it is a better approximation to assume the FL as random. Therefore, it is of interest
to study how this kind of consideration affect to the system. When it is switching from a
preferential attachment to a random FL there is a decrease in the degree heterogeneity of
the system and, therefore, it is expected that conditions for cooperation to prevail increase.
However, it is important to study this situation by comparing the results with those obtained
in systems with identical degree distribution but where the FL is performed by preferential
attachment. This is important to eliminate undesirable effects arising from differences in the
degree distributions. This can be done by considering the following forms of growth. On the
one hand, performing the FL random and the other L− 1 RL with preferential attachment.
On the other hand, making the FL with preferential attachment and one of the remaining
L − 1 in a random way. Although a more thorough study is necessary, we simply say that
this kind of consideration does not alter the conclusions reached.
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VI. GENERIC COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS
Figure 7: Generic cooperative systems. Illustration of the first 4 stages of the system.
In this section we study the model when n→ 0. This condition ensures that the system
is in equilibrium when a new individual or connection is introduced to it. In Figure 7 we
illustrate the first four stages of the system. The first stage represents the situation where
the system has two individuals, corresponding to the minimum system where the altruistic
act can exist. In this case there are three possible combinations of strategies: C−C, C−D
and D−D. For cases C −C and D−D the system is in equilibrium since both individuals
have equal Payoff and strategy. However, when each individual has a different strategy, the
defector has an advantage over the cooperator, given that b > −c for all b, c. Hence, the
cooperator becomes defector and drives cooperation to extinction. In consequence, the two
individuals should be cooperators to preserve cooperation within the system. In this way we
show the difficulty of the cooperation problem when framed into Darwinian Theory using
the prisoner’s dilemma as a metaphor of the conflict. Since it is not possible to incorporate
new connections to the system, the next stage corresponds to the incorporation of a new
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individual with a single connection. This can be cooperator or defector. In the latter case
the complete system is invaded by the defectors because defection always gets higher Payoff
than cooperation. This shows that the defection is a better strategy when individuals are
connected forming a linear chain. In the case that the new individual is a cooperator the
system is in equilibrium. Although the system has an individual with a higher Payoff than
other ones, nothing can change since all individuals have the same strategy. In this way
we show that under the hypothesis of the model at least the first three individuals must be
cooperators for cooperation to evolve.
In the next stage two things can happen: a new connection can arise between the two
disconnected individuals or the system can incorporates a new individual. The first case
has no impact on the strategies of the system because all individuals share the same one.
However, in the second case appears the possibility to connect the new individual to a
cooperator with two cooperative links instead of just one. In this case, when the new
individual is a defector and r > rc = 3, the cooperator has a greater Payoff than the defector
and therefore it became cooperator. In this way we show the importance that the degree
heterogeneity has for the evolution of cooperation. From this stage, the system remains fully
cooperative if each new defector is connected to individuals with at least two connections and
r > rc. In particular, when the formation of new connections is faster than the incorporation
of new individuals rc can be reduced. If new individuals are attached to ones with at least
k connections, then rc > (k + 1)/(k − 1) ensure c¯ = 1. This mechanism allows to form fully
cooperative structures of any topology and N > 3 without line connections. If besides it is
considered the elimination of nodes and links the model allows us the formation of networks
with line connections and, therefore, any topology.
For the conditions imposed, defectors always become cooperators, but never the reverse
happens, because the individual who is exploited has enough cooperative support from its
neighborhood. Therefore, we find that the system resists the invasion of defectors locally.
However, as shown throughout this work it can happen that the system has c¯ < 1 and keeps
the levels of cooperation when the system grows by new defectors. In this case, the defection
can invade part of the system but it has mechanisms that allow it to restore cooperation in
the parts affected by the defection. This suggests that the mechanisms by which the system
resists the defection invasions can range from local, where there are involved the exploited
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individual and its neighborhood, to global, where the whole system acts against defection
as it happens when it is considered static systems with Pc = 1/2.
VII. THE FIRST THREE COOPERATORS
In the previous section we reduced the Cooperative Seed to three individuals. In this,
we perform biological considerations that allow us to justify this structure. For this we
consider that individuals have the potential of reproduction. This feature is ubiquitous
in biological individuals except in some cases, as worker ants. If we also consider that
reproduction is sexual, we can justify the cooperation of the first two individuals. If there is
not cooperation for reproduction there are not offspring and the extinction of the species is
assured. Therefore, in species with sexual reproduction just evolve those individuals who are
cooperators at least to reproduce. In this case, the new individuals are a consequence of the
genetic reproduction. In the simplest case where the two cooperative individuals only have
one child with a single initial link, the problem is illustrated in the second stage of Figure
7 where cooperation is extinguished. As we showed throughout this work, cooperation can
emerge when there is heterogeneity between the new individual and the rest of the system.
In this case we can introduce the heterogeneity considering that offspring has less intrinsic
adaptability (IA) to the environment than their parents, where IA is the adaptability of
the individual living alone. Therefore, if we consider that adults have AI = 0 then the son
has AI = −d(t), where d > 0. It is expected that IA grows in time reaching d = 0 when
the offspring become adult.
Figure 8: The first three cooperators. The son becomes cooperator.
In Figure 8 we schematically place the mechanism by which the offspring becomes coop-
erator. We consider the case where there is only one son with only a link to one parent. In
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the first stage we show the two individuals that reproduce and, therefore, initially cooper-
ators. The system reaches the second stage when the son is conceived. It is important to
note that this analysis can be extended to the case of several sons as well as many links for
each new individual. As we shown in Figure if d > 2c the cooperator has a higher Payoff
than the new individual and therefore cooperation is a better strategy. This occurs until
the offspring grows to reach the condition d = 2c, from which defection is better. In our
case n→ 0 and thus it is assured that the new individual becomes cooperators imitating the
strategy of their parents. In this way we show conditions to form the first three cooperators.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study the cooperation problem framed within the evolutionary game
theory using the prisoner’s dilemma as a metaphor of the problem. Considering the grow-
ing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions that
allow forming highly cooperative systems of any size and topology when the possibility of
spontaneous changes of strategy are neglected. Performing considerations on the formation
of links and the incorporation of individuals, we reduce the required benefit-cost ratio for
cooperation to evolve approaching to the theoretical minimum r = 1, when the mean con-
nectivity of the individuals is increased. Also, we distinguish different mechanisms that allow
the system to maintain high levels of cooperation when the system grows by incorporation
of defectors. These mechanisms require heterogeneity among individuals for cooperation to
evolve. However, the required conditions and heterogeneities are drastically reduced as com-
pared to those required for static networks. In this way, we show that the growth process
of the system is essential for the evolution of cooperation when individual have imitation
capacity. These results together with the those showed in [31] give an answer to the first
question of the new formulation of the cooperation problem carried out in the introduction.
Therefore we shed light to the understanding of the emergence and persistence of coopera-
tion in structured populations within the Darwinian Theory. In particular, this work could
help to understand the evolution of our society as well as its structure. Besides, it could
be important for the development of a more egalitarian economy that improves the qual-
ity of life of our society. Finally, the results have important consequences in order to take
into account the possibility of mutations, since allow it study the problem assuming a fully
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cooperative system as initial condition.
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